For Aquinas, everything is regulated by eternal law or God’s creation order (I-II, Q.91, a.3), so it is no surprise that he understands natural law as participation of the eternal law, where natural law is of a general and teleological character (See I-II, Q.91, a.2). In Aquinas’s vision, natural law is linked with divine reason rather than with the will of God, as theologians such as Calvin would suggest. This opens the door for considering Aquinas’s notion of natural law to be expansive in the sense that natural law is associated with human’s capacity to reason and producing reflection. When …

Alving Plantinga’s criticism of Aquinas’s Doctrine of Divine Simplicity cannot be ignored since currently numerous philosophers and theologians follow him regarding the downplaying or rejecting DDS. In fact, engaging Plantinga’s arguments against DDS is a needed step in order to explore whether divine simplicity can be recorded in the analytic tradition. Embracing a non-constituent ontological framework where human concepts can apply univocally to God despite the limitations of human language (p. 18), Plantinga explores how God relates to abstract properties and the conflict between DDS and attributes such as aseity and sovereignty. Plantinga discusses Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity and offers …

Aquinas in Suma Theologica (II-II, Q.20, A.4) argues that sloth leads to despair. I will briefly explore how sloth might lead to despair, using Rebecca DeYoung’s reinterpretation on the nature of sloth in her book Glittering Vices (Brazos Press, 2009). Young briefly challenges the popular notion of understanding sloth as mere laziness. She argues that the modern concept of ‘sloth’ has departed significantly from the spiritual roots with which it had connections (p. 82). Young’s aim is to retrieve the Christian notion of sloth and clarify the misunderstandings around this concept. Young clings to Aquinas, who is in the middle …