N.T. Wright has offered Christian philosophers a proposal where it is apparently possible to hold the belief in the intermediate state-resurrection of the body and an ontological holism in the same sense at the same time. I argue that this not only creates a basic contradiction in Wright’s ontological paradigm, but also it is not a coherent and tenable proposal despite the fact one might eventually find a potential solution to such a quandary.
After engaging N.T. Wright’s article “Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body,” one can draw some significant conclusions. For Wright, the concept of the soul is not appealing, but a “flat idea.” There is an actual intermediate state where after bodily death a person goes and is sustained by God, and where such a person will be conscious but resting and enjoying God’s presence while inactive bodily. In the ultimate resurrection, God will embody such a person with a new immortal physical body without corruption again. In that respect, Wright offers Christian philosophers with regard to the mind- body debate a modified ontological holism—or at its best an Aristotelian- Thomistic holism. In my understanding, the modified alternative that Wright proposes is not more tenable than some dualist paradigms.
Nevertheless, without stirring up much controversy, Wright’s paradigm is making the soul discussion in anthropological theology and philosophy of religion harder than is necessary. If Wright is interested in continuing to defend the belief in a literal bodily resurrection, he should move to a better theoretical paradigm than ontological holism, which might allow him to support his ideas while avoiding unnecessary contradictions and inconsistencies. From what I have discussed in this study, Wright’s proposal is not very tenable despite the fact that there might exist a partial solution to his dilemma. The fact that one may find a particular solution to Wright’s quandary does not mean one might defend such an explanation theologically or philosophically at the same time. Many solutions to the soul-body problem may be valid in a particular sense, but they do not have the same degree of soundness. And this is the situation that happens with Wright’s paradigm: although one may argue that Wright’s contradictions in his proposal may be solved, this situation does not mean that such a proposal is not in conflict with important philosophical principles, such as Schopenhauer’s Law of Thoughts and Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. Wright’s paradigm might not be defensible philosophically, for instance. There currently exist more suitable models than a modified ontological holism for those who want to defend both the real existence of the intermediate state and the integral unity of the human person. Cooper’s dualistic-holistic paradigm, for example, holds both the unity of the human person in the present life and a temporary duality during the intermediate state. It is a mistake that Wright refers to all kinds of dualism as one unified thing in order to reject it, while at same time presuming some duality.
In the end, a theological paradigm with regard to the body-soul debate that may be valid and has soundness is one that is not only faithful to the Scripture but also coherent. Such a paradigm, without contradictions, may offer both the unity of human nature in the present life and a temporal duality-disembodiment in the intermediate state which allows the continuity of personhood after bodily death. Although Wright has done a commendable work in defending the intermediate state-resurrection of the body and the unity of the human person, I find his particular view on the relation of both beliefs problematic and contradictory because of his presumption of duality in an ontological holism.
*This is a summary of the paper published as “N.T. Wright and the Body-Soul Predicament: The Presumption of Duality in Ontological Dualism,” Stromata: The Graduate Journal of Calvin Theological Seminary 58, no.1 (Fall/Winter 2016): 111-136. If you’d like to read this paper in full, please click here. All rights reserved by the publisher. Used by permission.
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